Not all, but 99% of them are
. Try this one
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100% undetectable, each packet traverses a separate route. you don't just hook to 1 proxy server, its a worldwide network of them. Pretty cool, but kinda slow. The only way to "break" it at all requires someone having access to both sides (your computer and the target computer) and comparing what goes out of your computer on the way to TOR with what arrives on the other side, and correlating the time and total # of bytes. not sure that is enough to hold up in court either, and if they have that kind of access on both ends, they'll hit you eventually one way or another anyhow
"Dan Egerstad, a Swedish security consultant, revealed that he had intercepted usernames and passwords for a large number of email accounts, by operating and monitoring Tor exit nodes.[6] On November 15, 2007, he was arrested on charges stemming from discovering and publishing this information. As Tor does not, and by design cannot, encrypt the traffic between an exit node and the target server, any exit node is in a position to capture any traffic which is not encrypted at the application layer, e.g. by SSL. While this does not inherently violate the anonymity of the source, it affords added opportunities for data interception by self-selected third parties, greatly increasing the risk of exposure of sensitive data by users who are careless or who mistake Tor's anonymity for security."
"6 Conclusions
We have presented an attack against Tor, a deployed and
well used, anonymising protocol. This attack can be performed
by a modest adversary, using powers well within
the restricted Tor threat model. In fact, we show that the
anonymising network itself can be used to route probe traf-
fic and gather information otherwise available only to a
global passive adversary.
In November 2004 we performed extensive experiments
on current Tor nodes and found them to be susceptible to
our attack. This does not give us the ability to trace the
actual originator of the communication, since we do not
have the ability to observe who is connected to a Tor node.
Nevertheless our attacks greatly degrade the anonymity provided
by Tor, by allowing adversaries to discover the path
of a Tor connection and thereby reducing the protection to
the level provided by a collection of simple proxy servers.
We expect the same attack to be usable against other lowlatency
anonymising network designs, since none of them
have been specially hardened against it.
Furthermore, since Tor reuses the same path for multiple
streams within a short time interval, our attacks allow
different operations to be linked to the same initiator with
greater certainty. The observable path of each stream can
act as an identifier or identity that links streams amongst
themselves and to the initiator – a property that makes Tor
weaker than a simple proxy when it comes to protecting the
unlinkability of actions.
We discussed some strategies that could be used to protect
Tor against our attacks. They all, to some degree, involve
an increase in the latency of the communication. They
also highlight the need for a full covert-channel analysis of
such anonymising networks, to assess whether any information
that could be used for traffic-analysis is leaked to other
streams that are potentially observable by an adversary.
This attack brings the field of anonymous communications
even closer to more traditional computer security disciplines.
On one hand we show that the literature on covert
channel analysis and elimination is directly applicable and
necessary to truly secure Tor. On the other hand, our attack
relies on using Tor nodes as oracles that disclose their load
– therefore not requiring a global observer. Similar techniques
have been used in the past in breaking cryptographic
protocols, by using and combining the services they provide.
It is the first time that such techniques are applied for
traffic-analysis of anonymous communication systems."
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