The premise of science is proving something works or it dosent. The results are consistent and repeatable. This is the nature and the definition of science, evolution cannot be proven nor is it repeatable it therefore does not classify as science. It takes a ton of faith to believe such a week theory.
Sorry for the length...
"It is often argued, by philosophers and creationists alike, that Darwinism is not falsifiable, and so is not science. This rests on the opinion that something is only science if it can be falsified, i.e., proven wrong, at least in principle. This view, which is due to Popper, is not at all universally accepted, and some history of philosophy is in order to make sense of it and the criticisms made of it...
Back to evolution. It becomes clear why the simple-minded parroting, even by scientists, that if it can't be falsified it isn't science, is not sufficient to rule out a theory. What science actually is, is a matter for extreme debate. The rediscovery post-Merton of the social nature of science has thrown eternal Scientific Methods out the window, but that doesn't mean that science is no longer distinguishable from non-science. It just isn't as easy as one would like in an ideal world. Last I looked, it wasn't an ideal world, anyway.
However, on the ordinary understanding of falsification,
Darwinian evolution can be falsified. What's more, it can be verified in a non-deductive sort of way. Whewell was right in the sense that you can show the relative validity of a theory if it pans out enough, and Popper had a similar notion, called 'verisimilitude'. What scientists do, or even what they say they do, is in the end very little affected by a priori philosophical prescriptions. Darwin was right to take the approach he did.
It is significant that, although it is often claimed that Darwinism is unfalsifiable, many of the things Darwin said have in fact been falsified. Many of his assertions of fact have been revised or denied, many of his mechanisms rejected or modified even by his strongest supporters (e.g., by Mayr, Gould, Lewontin, and Dawkins), and he would find it hard to recognise some versions of modern selection theory as his natural selection theory. This is exactly what a student of the history of science would expect. Science moves on, and if a theory doesn't, that is strong prima facie evidence it actually is a metaphysical belief."
And...
"The prediction is a deductive consequence of a true theory and proper measurements.
Since evolution cannot make predictions of this kind, and in fact any outcome is compatible with the theory, its critics say that evolution is not a complete science (see the section on the tautology of fitness).
However, there are problems with this highly idealised view of scientific explanation, and anyway, I will argue it doesn't affect evolution.
Any set of laws are ideal simplifications. In order to predict where a planet is going to be in 10,000 years, you have to ignore may things, such as the very small bodies, the influence of distant stars and galaxies, friction due to solar wind, and so forth. And it works, to a degree. But that degree is still real. You may only be off a few meters, but you will be off, due to these ignored complications. Physical systems of this kind are stable, in that the initial conditions do not greatly affect the outcome.
Evolution is not like these systems. It is highly sensitive to the initial conditions and the boundary conditions that arise during the course of evolution. You cannot predict with any reasonable degree of accuracy what mutations will arise, which genotypes will recombine, and what other events will perturb the way species develop over time. Moreover, the so-called 'laws' of genetics and other biological rules are not laws. They are exceptional. Literally. For every law, right down to the so-called 'central dogma' of molecular genetics, there is at least one exception.
And yet, we know the properties of many biological processes and systems well enough to predict what they will do in the absence of any other influences. This is proven in the lab daily. So, in this way, we have in biology the extreme end of the continuum of what we have in physics at the other end. The difference is one of degree, not kind. And more and more, physicists are uncovering systems that are similarly unstable and sensitive. You cannot predict in physics what any small number of molecules will do in a flame, or in a large gas volume, for example. And while the weather cannot be predicted at all in fine detail for very long, you can explain last week's weather through the initial conditions and the laws of thermodynamics, etc, after it has happened.
If you take the standard form of biological explanation, it has the same structure as a physical explanation. It just differs in two ways. First, you cannot isolate 'extraneous' influences ahead of time for wild populations. Second, you cannot make a prediction much beyond the immediate short term (hence, nobody can predict the future of evolution of a species). Although a number of experiments have been conducted to test selectionist hypotheses through prediction, such as the studies on finches in the Galápagos Islands by the Grants, mostly, explanations in evolution take the following format:
Initial Conditions at t-n + Properties if biological systems ⇒ Observed phenomenon at t
In other words, they are retrodictions, not predictions. The only formal difference between this and the same form in physics is that the tense is different. This use of the nomological-deductive model in historical cases is called a covering law model [Dray 1957, 1966].
So, physics is not really a different kind of science to evolutionary biology, except in some matters of convenience with experimentation, and the degree of the stability of the systems it sometimes explains, and not always then.
Covering law explanations can be used to retrodict the initial conditions, under certain circumstances. If you know what is now in evidence, and you have laws that generate these outcomes, you can sometimes predict what will be found:
Predicted initial conditions + Universal Laws ⇒ Observed phenomena
For example - you know that certain features of ants are derived (not in the primitive ancestor). You have general laws of evolution that account for the phenomena you observe (actual ants today, and in the fossil record). So, you predict that a certain transitional form will be found. When it is, you have made a bona fide prediction.
What special conditions can this be done under? Well, for a start, if you have a deductive argument if A then B, you cannot immediately infer from the existence or truth of B, that A. It might have been something else. B might have a virtual infinity of possible causes. Before you can make a retrodiction like this, you have to narrow down the field. That is, you have to assume the validity of some theoretical models before you can make the retrodiction/prediction. On the other hand, if you make such a claim, and it pans out, you have certainly strengthened your model.